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Abstract. Graph neural networks (GNNs) achieve remarkable perfor-
mance for tasks on graph data. However, recent works show they are
extremely vulnerable to adversarial structural perturbations, making
their outcomes unreliable. In this paper, we propose DefenseVGAE, a
novel framework leveraging variational graph autoencoders(VGAEs) to
defend GNNs against such attacks. DefenseVGAE is trained to recon-
struct graph structure. The reconstructed adjacency matrix can reduce
the effects of adversarial perturbations and boost the performance of
GCNs when facing adversarial attacks. Our experiments on a number
of datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed method under var-
ious threat models. Under some settings it outperforms existing de-
fense strategies. Our code has been made publicly available at https:
//github.com/zhangao520/defense-vgae.
Keywords: Graph neural networks · Adversarial defense · Variational
graph auto-encoder
1 Introduction
Graphs are a natural representation that can model diverse data from nearly
all scientific and engineering applications, such as social networks, citation net-
works, molecular structure. Not surprisingly, machine learning on graph data
has a longstanding history. Specifically, graph neural networks (GNNs) starts to
push forward the performance of several fundamental tasks ranging from node
classification[11], over community detection[24], to generative modeling[12].
Here we focus on semi-supervised node classification given a single large
(attributed) graph and the class labels of a few nodes the goal is to predict
the labels of the remaining unlabelled nodes. Graph Convolutional Networks
(GCNs)[11] and their recent improvements[13,26] have shown great success in
node classification tasks by performancing convolution operations aggregating
and combining the information of neighbor nodes in the graph domain.
Despite GCNs have improved the state of the art in node classification,
they can be attacked on multiple front - changing only a few links or node
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attributes which are unnoticeable to the users can lead to completely wrong
predictions[27,28,20,2]. Two types of threat models have been considered in re-
cent literatures: under the targeted attack model, the attacker aims to let the
trained model misclassify some target nodes; whereas in the untargeted attack
model, the attacker aims to hinder overall model performance on all test data.
This poor adversarial robustness is bound to arouse concerns about applying
GCNs to real world applications, especially those safety-critical domains such as
fraud detection[21], protein interface prediction[5], breast cancer classification[16].
Therefore, adversarial defence studies play a crucial role in graph domain and
their goal is to detect or defend attacks and introduce strategies that are more
robust against adversarial perturbations.
Various defenses have been proposed to mitigate the effect of adversarial at-
tacks on graph data. There are three categories of defense mechanisms[9]: (1)
changing GNN models manner of learning to make the classifier more robust
against attacks, e.g., graph adversarial training which injects adversarial exam-
ples into the training set[23,4]. (2) attempting to purify the perturbed graph
data[3,22]. (3) learning an attention mechanism to distinguish adversarial edges
and nodes from the clean ones[25]
A few pieces of work[15,17,19,8,6] in the existing literature on defense against
adversarial attacks on image domain have attempted to use generative models to
purify input data that may have added adversarial perturbations. These meth-
ods mostly work by using a generative model to learn the data distribution and
projecting the adversarial examples to the manifold of legitimate, or natural
examples. Inspired by this methodology, we propose a novel defense mechanism
which is effective against adversarial attacks on graph data. We propose to lever-
age a variational graph autoencoder(VGAE) to encode a graph with adversarial
perturbed structure into a latent representation matching a prior distribution
and reconstruct graph structure from the latent representation, then we recover
the reconstructed adjacency matrix’s sparsity and use it to train a GCN model
which can significantly resist the structure attacks.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
– We propose a VGAE-based defense method, which we call DefenseVGAE
to effectively resist against adversarial attacks on graph data. The proposed
method has a desirable effect of suppressing the adversarial perturbations.
– Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method
on on three benchmark graph datasets under different threat models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review necessary
background regarding GCNs, known attack models, defense mechanisms and
VGAEs. Our proposed method is formally motivated and introduced in Section
3. Experimental results, under different threat models, as well as comparisons
to other defenses are presented in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 5.
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2 Related Work
In this work, we propose to use VGAEs for the purpose of defending against
adversarial attacks in semi-supervised node classification task. Before specifying
our approach in the next section, we explain related work in four parts. First, we
describe the graph convolutional network paradigm as representative for victim
models. Next, we discuss different attack methods employed in the literature.
We, then, go over related defense mechanisms against these attacks and dis-
cuss their strengths and shortcomings. Lastly, we explain necessary background
information regarding VGAEs.
2.1 Graph Convolutional Network
Given an undirected, unweighted graph G = (V, E) with N nodes vi ∈ V, edges
(vi, vj) ∈ E , an adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N ,a degree matrix Dii =
∑
j Aij ,
and node features X ∈ RN×D. A multi-layer GCN forward model then takes the
simple form:
H(l+1) = σ
(
D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2H(l)W (l)
)
(1)
where A˜ = A + IN and D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij , and σ is the activation function to in-
troduce non-linearity, H(0) = X, W (l)(l = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1) are weight matrices.
A fully connected layer with softmax function is usually applied after L layers
of graph convolution layers for the classification. A two-layer GCN is commonly
considered for semi-supervised node classification tasks. The model can, there-
fore, be described as:
Z = f(X,A) = softmax
(
AˆReLU
(
AˆXW (0)
)
W (1)
)
(2)
where Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 is the symmetrically normalized adjacency matrix.
2.2 Graph Adversarial Attacks
The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial attacks has generated a
lot of interest and concern in the past few years[7,14]. Adversaries can manipulate
deep-learning outputs by adding imperceptible perturbations on benign data.
Most of the researches on adversarial machine learning are focused on algorithms
to fool deep neural networks, mainly for the task of image classification.
Recently, some adversarial attack methods on graph data have been proposed
to reveal the vulnerability of GCNs. Attack algorithms can be categorized into
different types based on different goals, resources, knowledge and capacity of
attackers[9].
– Poisoning or Evasion. Evasion attacks happen after the GNN model is
trained or in the test phase, while poisoning attacks happen before the GNN
model is trained.
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– Targeted or Non-targeted. Under the targeted attack model, the attacker
aims to let the trained model misclassify some target nodes; whereas in the
untargeted attack model, the attacker aims to hinder overall model perfor-
mance on all test data.
– Modifying Feature or Edges. The attacker can insert adversarial perturba-
tions from different aspects. The perturbations can be categorized as mod-
ifying node features or adding/deleting edges under certain budget of total
actions.
2.3 Graph Adversarial Defenses
Various defense mechanisms have been employed to combat the threat from
adversarial attacks. In what follows, we describe some representative defense
strategies working on poisoning attacks.
GCN-Jaccard Wu et al.[22] proposed a defense method by removing the edges
whose two end nodes have small Jaccard similarity basing on an empirical ob-
servations of the attack methods: attackers tend to add edges which connect to
nodes with different features. The experimental results demonstrate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the proposed defense method, however this method can
only work when the node features are available.
GCN-SVD Entezari et al.[3] observed that Nettack[27] results in changes in
high-rank spectrum of the graph, which corresponds to low singular values. Thus
they proposed to purify the perturbed adjacency matrix by using truncated SVD
to get its low-rank approximation. However, our experiments show that GCN-
SVD does not always guarantee a good performance on clean data.
RGCN RGCN[25] enhances the robustness of GCNs against adversarial attacks
by using Gaussian distributions in hidden layers and learning variance-based
attention weights in aggregating node neighborhoods. Actually, the Gaussian
distributions in hidden layer are also used in variational graph autoencoders,
which are the basis of our approach.
2.4 Variational Graph Autoencoder
The variational graph autoencoder[12] is a framework combining graph convolu-
tional networks and variational inference which maps nodes into a latent feature
space and decode graph information from from normal distribution. VGAEs can
be used to learn network embeddings or generate new graphs. For the variational
graph encoder, we optimize the variational lower bound as follows:
L = Eq(Z|(X,A))[log p(Aˆ|Z)]−KL[q(Z|X,A)‖p(Z)] (3)
Here, KL[q(·)‖p(·)] is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between q(·) and p(·).
p(Z) =
∏
i p (zi) =
∏
iN (zi|0, I) is a Gaussian prior.
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3 Methodology
We propose a new defense strategy which uses a VGAE trained on the perturbed
graph data to reconstruct the adjacency matrix to mitigate adversarial pertur-
bations. Given a perturbed graph Gˆ = (Aˆ, Xˆ) which was attacked by adding or
removing edges with regard to the clean graph data G = (A,X) - here we focus
on graph structure attacks, i.e., Xˆ = X. If we are not aware of this attack, the
trained GCN model on Gˆ will misclassify the target nodes or have bad overall
performance on all test data which could raise security concerns. In order to to
mitigate malicious perturbations’ impact, we trained a VGAE gGˆ on the graph
Gˆ and reconstructed the adjacency matrix Aˆ. When the reconstructed adjacency
matrix A˜ = gGˆ(Aˆ, Xˆ) is used, the GCN model can significantly resist the attacks.
The overview of the proposed method is described in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Overview of the DefenseVGAE algorithm.
3.1 Training Process of DefenseVGAE
DefenseVGAE is comprised of a graph convolutional network (GCN) encoder
and a simple inner product decoder. The encoder is defined by an inference
model parameterized by a two-layer GCN:
q(Z|A,X) =
N∏
i=1
q (zi|A,X) (4)
q (zi|A,X) = N
(
zi|µi,diag
(
σ2i
))
(5)
Here µ = GCNµ(A,X) is the matrix of mean vectors µi; similarly logσ =
GCNσ(A,X). The two-layer GCN is defined as GCN(A,X) = A˜ReLU
(
A˜XW0
)
W1,
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with weight matrices Wi. GCNµ(A,X) and GCNσ(A,X) share first-layer pa-
rameters W0. Our decoder model is used to reconstruct structure A, predicting
whether there is a link between two nodes by an inner product between latent
variables.
p(A|Z) =
N∏
i=1
ΠNj=1p (Aij |zi, zj) , with p (Aij = 1|zi, zj) = sigmoid
(
z>i zj
)
(6)
We minimize the loss function as:
L = LRC + LKL (7)
Here
LRC = λ
∑
Aij log Aˆij +
∑
(1−Aij) log(1− Aˆij) (8)
LKL = µ2 + σ2 − log
(
σ2 − 1) (9)
As A is very sparse, it can be beneficial to re-weight terms with Aij = 1 in LRC.
3.2 Recover the Reconstructed Stucture’s Spasity
We denote RA as the proportion of the non-zero elements of A. gG is the VGAE
trained on the given graph G = (A,X). Then we have the reconstructed adja-
cency matrix
A˜ = gG(A,X) (10)
Next we make A˜ a sparse matrix A˜∗ with a proper RA˜∗ by the following principle:
A˜∗ij =
{
1 if A˜ij > p
0 otherwise
with p = percentile(A˜, 100(1−RA˜∗)) (11)
The work [27] showed high degree nodes are slightly harder to attack: they
have both, higher classification accuracy in the clean graph and in the attacked
graph. Therefore we can perform a hyperparameter search on RA˜∗ above RA,
i.e. we prefer a A˜∗ which is less sparse than A, and select the one with the best
validation accuracy.
4 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed defense
technique under different settings.
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4.1 Experimental Settings
Dataset:We use widely used Cora, Citeseer[18] and Polblogs[1] datasets. Dataset
statistics are summarized in Table 1. We closely follow the experimental settings
in previous works[12,3].
Specifically, we adopt the same dataset splits as in [12] for Cora and Citeseer
datasets, and for Polblogs we split the network in labeled (20%) and unlabeled
nodes(80%). Half of the labeled data is used for training and the other half is
used for validation in the process of training the GCN model. We first train the
GCN surrogate model on the labeled data and then we select 500 target nodes
classified correctly from test set.
As Polblogs does not provide node features, the attribute matrix is set to an
identity matrix by default.
Table 1. Dataset statistics
Datasets Nodes Edges Classes Features
Cora 2708 5429 7 1433
Citeseer 3327 4732 6 3703
Polblogs 1490 19025 2 1490
Baselines and Adversarial Attack Methods: To evaluate the performance
of DefenseVGAE, we compare it with the natural trained GCN and three effec-
tive defense methods: GCN-Jaccard[22], GCN-SVD[3] and RGCN[25] under the
targeted Nettack[27] and untargetd Metattack[28]. For both attacking methods,
we focus on changing graph structures.
Parameter Settings: We train VGAEs for 250 iterations for the Cora and
Citeseer datasets, and 500 iterations for the Polblogs dataset using Adam[10]
with a learning rate of 0.001. We construct encoders with a 32-neuron hidden
layer and a 16-neuron embedding layer for all the experiments. For GCN and
baselines, we retain to the settings described in the corresponding papers.
4.2 Results on Clean Datasets
To build a reference line, we first conduct experiments on the clean datasets,
i.e. datasets that are not attacked. Figure 2 demonstrates how the ratio of RA˜∗
and RA affects the test accurary of GCN models trained on the reconstructed
adjacency matrix.
In the following experiments under the targeted attack, we do not perform
hyperparameter search on RA˜∗ and fix RA˜∗/RA to be 20 for the reason that
the number of edges added or removed is extremely limited, and the time cosu-
consuming hyperparameter searching brings is unnecessary as we mainly focus
on the defense performance. The results shown in Table 2 are also under this
setting. Note that we do not have the performance for Jaccard defense model in
Polblogs since this model requires node features but Polblogs does not provide
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Fig. 2. Red lines show test accurary under different reconstructed matrix’s sparsity.
Black dashed lines are test accurary of the natural trained GCN models.
node features. We can also observe that SVD defense model decreases the accu-
racy on Cora and Citeseer datasets too much. The reductions of the proposed
DefenseVGAE’s accuracy are whin 2% which lays the foundation for applying it
to the adversarial settings.
Table 2. The results of node classification accuracy (in percentages) on clean datasets.
Methods Cora Citeseer Polblogs
GCN 80.4 68.1 95.71
GCN-Jaccard 78.3 68.5 –
GCN-SVD 64.2 59.4 93.87
RGCN 79.8 69.0 95.19
Ours 78.6 67.8 95.40
4.3 Results on Targeted Attacks
In this section, we first evaluate the classification accuracy of targeted nodes
against targeted adversarial attacks. We adopt Nettack as the attack method.
According to the algorithm proposed in [27], there are two different ways to
attack a target node : direct attack called Nettack, and influence attack called
Nettack-In which attacks a node indirectly. In our experiments we only consider
attacking each target node directly, as it is a stronger attack compared to an
indirect attack. Also we only consider structure attack. We first use Nettack to
generate different numbers of perturbations for the targeted nodes, where one
perturbation is defined as adding or deleting one edge in the graph. Then, we
retrain the GCN model for poisoning attacks. Finally, we test whether each GCN
can classify its corresponding targeted node, i.e. whether we successfully defend
the attack. We vary the number of perturbations from 1 to 5. The results are
reported in Table 3.
From Table 3, we can identify that the performance of all methods decays
rapidly with respect to the number of perturbations, demonstrating that Net-
tack is a very strong attack method. By enabling our defense approach, the
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accuracy can be significantly elevated. Especially we can see that DefenseVGAE
is consistently outperform all baselines on Cora dataset.
Table 3. Results of different method when adopting Nettack as the attack method.
Note N denotes the number of perturbations. And we do not have the performance
for SVD defense model in Cora and Citeseer since it sacrifices two much accuracy on
clean data.
Datasets N 1 2 3 4 5
GCN 54.8 24.0 12.0 6.4 3.6
Jaccard 68.6 46.8 32.8 21.6 15.4
Cora RGCN 55.6 26.2 12.8 7.0 4.6
Ours 81.8 62.4 45.2 30.8 19.0
GCN 28.6 10.8 5.4 2.4 1.2
Jaccard 79.8 67.0 54.8 46.6 39.4
Citeseer RGCN 25.0 11.2 5.6 1.8 1.4
Ours 66.0 47.6 37.8 27.4 20.6
GCN 89.6 81.6 69.2 61.4 59.4
SVD 96.4 93.4 88.2 83.8 79.6
Polblogs RGCN 90.2 80.0 65.8 57.8 57.4
Ours 94.0 90.8 86.2 81.6 77.2
4.4 Results on Untargeted Attacks
In this section, we continue to evaluate the overall classification accuracy of
different methods against untargeted adversarial attacks. We adopt Metattack as
the attack method in the form of poisoning attack and structure attack similarly.
Note that we vary the perturbations from 1% to 5% with a step of 1%. The results
are demonstrated in Table 4.
From Table 4, we can see DefenseVGAE is consistently outperform all base-
lines on Citeseer dataset. On Cora dataset our proposed method outperform all
baselines when Metattack perturbs 1%, 3% and 4% edges.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed DefenseVGAE, a novel defense strategy utilizing
VGAEs to enhance the robustness of node classification models against targeted
or untargeted graph adversarial attacks. We show that our proposed method
is effective against commonly considered adversarial attacks and achieve a per-
formance close to the performance on the clean graph. Under some settings it
outperforms the strong baslines. We will futher investigate using DefenseVGAE
to defend against attacks perturbing node features. Moreover, the success of
DefenseVGAE relies on the expressiveness and generative power of the VGAE.
However, finding better-suited prior distributions and more flexible generative
models is still a challenging task and an active area of research.
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Table 4. Results of different method when adopting Metattack as the attack method.
Note that r denotes perturbation rate.
Datasets r(%) 1 2 3 4 5
GCN 77.8 74.7 72.3 69.3 67.4
Jaccard 76.8 76.4 74.5 72.0 71.6
Cora RGCN 77.9 77.3 74.6 73.5 70.0
Ours 78.4 76.4 75.0 73.9 67.8
GCN 65.4 62.0 56.5 55.7 53.5
Jaccard 65.6 63.3 63.0 62.1 62.1
Citeseer RGCN 61.6 58.9 56.0 57.8 53.3
Ours 66.1 63.9 64.2 63.3 64.6
GCN 84.20 82.92 79.75 79.14 77.20
SVD 94.07 94.17 94.27 94.17 93.46
Polblogs RGCN 84.20 83.64 79.55 78.32 77.10
Ours 92.74 93.87 93.66 93.35 93.25
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